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The Meaning of Moving Sand 
Towards a Dust Bowl Mythology 
 
Article for Global Environment 
 
What would twenty-first century American television make of the Dust Bowl? It would 
depend on whether someone supplied a major news station with some really good pictures. In 
the absence of visuals, the event would not stand a chance. But even if a camera captured a 
spectacular shot of the moving wall of sand, the dust storms probably would not figure 
prominently. Editors would be inclined to place them at the end of the evening news. They are 
a meteorological event after all, and thus make for a great prelude to the weather forecast. The 
news team would make some light-hearted remarks about some really great pictures coming 
up. A few replays in slow motion would give them a chance to thank the affiliate station for 
the footage. With a bit of luck, they would even say a few things about the place. After the 
lights go out, the editor would probably instruct his crew to mark the calendar for a follow-up 
report a few weeks down the road. Some pictures might go viral on twitter. Nobody would 
talk about a new federal agency. 
The thought experiment may be tongue-in-cheek, but it speaks about more than the 
inherent cynicism of twenty-first century television news. Imagining the Dust Bowl in a 
different frame of reference shatters the cognitive certainty that has traditionally surrounded 
the event. A number of powerful narratives seek to define the Dust Bowl as a showcase for 
more general points: about the need for soil conservation, about the legitimacy of federal 
agencies (or lack thereof), about the fragility of the American Dream, about the 
destructiveness of agricultural capitalism or simply as an example for some really tough 
years. Whatever you say about the event, there is no denying its versatility for starkly 
divergent readings. Tell me what you think about the Dust Bowl, and I will tell you what you 
think about America. 
The Dust Bowl begat a veritable bonanza of storytelling, and we can see the consequences 
down to the choice of words. Even using the “Dust Bowl” implies decisions over narratives, 
as it highlights the dust storms at the expense of the preceding drought. Yet as Bill Cronon 
reminded environmental historians, “The stories we tell about the past do not exist in a 
vacuum.”1 Among the instruments that historians have employed for dissecting stories, none 
is more pertinent for the present endeavor than the importance of social groups, a topic of 
                                                        
This article is dedicated to the memory of Dan Yaalon. I wish to thank Pamela Riney-Kehrberg and the other 
authors in this special issue for their comments. 
1  William Cronon, "A Place for Stories: Nature, History, and Narrative," Journal of American History 78 
(1992): 1347-1376; p. 1372. See also William Cronon, "Storytelling," American Historical Review 118 
(2013): 1-19. 
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memory research even since Maurce Halbwachs’ pioneering essay on collective memory.2 
Narratives of the Dust Bowl mirror the interests and worldviews of specific groups, and we 
cannot understand the power of these narratives if we fail to reflect on the place of these 
groups in society.3 
We can see the importance of groups in the remarkable absence of learning experiences. A 
wide array of narratives have evolved since the 1930s, and they usually displayed benign 
neglect towards other readings: narratives developed autonomously, with little positive 
reference to preceding interpretations. What might look like a recurring act of amnesia was 
really a social necessity. Groups and generations have invented their own Dust Bowls 
according to their own distinct inclinations and interests, and other readings were competing 
interpretations rather than intellectual challenges. Disagreements over the Dust Bowl 
mirrored, and to some extend molded, the powers in play in society far beyond agricultural 
matters. 
Cronon and others have discussed narratives in the form of books, but a Dust Bowl 
mythology needs to move beyond the written word. Pictures played a key role in the cultural 
construction of the Dust Bowl, and their career provided a showcase for the ambiguities of 
photographic documentation that Susan Sontag described as follows: “while an event known 
through photographs certainly becomes more real than it would have been had one never seen 
the photographs, after repeated exposure it also becomes less real.”4 Furthermore, this article 
makes an effort to bring the actual work of soil conservation into a discussion of narratives. 
Scholars have long recognized that one cannot understand the practice of soil conservation 
without a discussion of narratives, but the reverse is no less true: we cannot understand 
narratives without an understanding of social practice. Remembering is as much a matter of 
looking at pictures and reading books as working to conserve the land. 
Bringing in first-hand experience makes narratives less clear-cut; but we should probably 
see that as an advantage. It offers an escape from the simple morals that often characterize 
discussions of this kind. Mythologies tend to invite either celebrations or exorcisms, and as 
we will see, there is no lack of Dust Bowl narratives that convey a sense of moral clarity. 
However, these readings usually took shape at a distance. It was always easier to make sense 
of the Dust Bowl from afar, and the Southern Plains – the area primarily affected by the Dust 
Bowl – effectively became a canvas for different readings. The history of the Dust Bowl is 
also about the cultural occupation of a peripheral region, and yet that region was really more                                                         
2  Maurice Halbwachs, On Collective Memory. Edited, Translated, and with an Introduction by Lewis A. Coser 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992). 
3  Failure to identify groups and interests involved encourages a dubious lack of specificity. For example, a 
recent handbook article summarized scholarship on the Dust Bowl by identifying three interpretations: 
“declensionist, progressive, and the ‘middle ground’”, with the declensionist reading as “the dominant one 
since the 1930s.” (David Moon, "The Grasslands of North America and Russia," in John R. McNeill and Erin 
Stewart Mauldin [eds.], A Companion to Global Environmental History [Malden, Mass.: Wiley-Blackwell, 
2012], pp. 247-262; p. 256, 252.) However, declensionist interpretations can take a multitude of forms, seize 
on different targets, and empower different groups. 
4  Susan Sontag, Regarding the Pain of Others (London: Penguin Books, 2003), p. 94. 
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than a passive backdrop. It was a vast space filled with people, plants, machines, and soils, 
and it is high time that we give them a place in our narratives. In short, this Dust Bowl 
mythology is more than a critical discussion of cultural memories. It is a necessary 
precondition for Dust Bowl narratives that are rooted in the ground.  
 
 
The Setting 
 
If there were a competition for the U.S. region least likely to make world history, the 
Southern Plains would be a promising contender. It was an inhospitable place that figured on 
nineteenth-century maps as the “Great American Desert”.5 It lacked strategic significance 
until Cold War generals found the sparsely populated region the right place for 
intercontinental missiles. It did not have a large commodity hub or a commercial center, let 
alone a place with a vibrant cultural scene. The region did not even possess a distinctive 
landscape. Its original vegetation was grass, a ground cover that rarely generates excitement, 
and that grassland was shrinking tremendously in the wake of frontier expansion – so much so 
that people who grew up in the region sometimes failed to recognize that grass was the 
original vegetation.6 The region’s prime commodities were wheat and petroleum, two 
products that modern societies consume en masse. In a nineteenth-century context, the 
region’s most distinctive feature was delayed frontier development; the government called it 
“the last frontier of agriculture” in 1923.7 Land-hungry settlers tried to avoid the “Great 
American Desert” as long as they could. 
The region thrived in the wake of increasing commodity prices during and after World 
War One. Tractors allowed plowing up land more easily, with wheat emerging as the boom 
crop par excellence. Between 1925 and 1931 alone, wheat acreage in the Southern Plains 
region grew by 200 percent. However, agricultural development retained an air of 
speculation, with “suitcase farming” as the most glaring manifestation. Investors from outside 
the region bought farmland, put some seed into the ground and then left fields to themselves 
until the time of the harvest, when they would come back and bring to market whatever had 
grown.8 
Suitcase farming was a gamble, but that arguably held true for wheat production on the 
Southern Plains more generally. Wheat was sown in the fall and harvested in the summer, 
leaving the ground without vegetation cover for a long period of time. Furthermore, the 
Southern Plains knew harsh weather, with temperature and rainfall varying tremendously. The                                                         
5  Timothy Egan, The Worst Hard Time: The Untold Story of Those Who Survived the Great American Dust 
Bowl (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 2006), p. 22. 
6  Donald Worster, Dust Bowl: The Southern Plains in the 1930s. Twenty-Fifth Anniversary Edition (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2004), p. 244. 
7  Egan, Worst Hard Time, p. 57. 
8  R. Douglas Hurt, The Dust Bowl: An Agricultural and Social History (Chicago: Nelson-Hall, 1981), p. 24, 
27n. 
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region enjoyed warm and humid winds from the Gulf of Mexico as well as cold air from the 
North. It was also a prime tornado region, as if to underscore the inherent violence of the 
regional climate. One of the most frightening things about the dust storms of the 1930s was 
that they seemingly came out of nowhere. “When the storms hit, they usually came without 
warning”, Timothy Egan wrote.9 
It was as if the region had been set up as a wind erosion experiment. It had powerful 
winds, it was arid, and agriculture removed the grass that had traditionally held the soil in its 
place. It was really more a matter of when dust storms would come and how bad they would 
be, rather whether they would come at all. The region’s susceptibility to dust storms before 
the 1930s is a matter of historical debate ever since James Malin’s pioneering work on history 
and ecology in the trans-Mississippi West.10 The region has also experienced further events 
after the 1930s, though none achieved a similar notoriety. The shock of the Dust Bowl said as 
much about nature as about the state of mind of the region’s inhabitants. 
As settlement was a recent phenomenon, few locals had much experience with the region’s 
climate. Weather conditions during the 1920s were favorable, and it was tempting to assume 
that they would stay that way, an act of wishful thinking underscored by popular notions such 
as the rain following the plow. Few settlers had experience with farming in arid environments. 
And, needless to say, none of the region’s farmers could know that the drought would stay 
until 1940. All that most farmers had was the experience of a few good harvests. As Pamela 
Riney-Kehrberg has noted, “Farmers expected to have a crop failure once every five years 
and moderate to overwhelming success in the intervening years. But nothing had prepared 
them for a bumper crop followed by eight years of total or near crop failure.”11 
Resorting to expert advice did not offer much help either. The region’s most important 
farming authority of the early twentieth century was Hardy Webster Campbell, who 
advocated a dry farming method for the preservation of moisture in the soil. Campbell 
promoted his method as the magic recipe for agriculture under Great Plains conditions and 
traveled the region with support from railroads, banking, real estate, and other commercial 
interests. Campbell stood outside the evolving network of academic, state-sponsored research 
and extension work, and his methods were neither approved nor encouraged by the 
government’s farming experts.12 Understanding the peculiarities of the region was a challenge 
not only for farmers but also for scientists and advisors. 
                                                        
9  Egan, Worst Hard Time, p. 7. 
10  Cf. James C. Malin, “The Adaptation of the Agricultural System to Sub-Humid Environment,” Agricultural 
History 10:3 (1936): 118-141; James C. Malin, The Grasslands of North America. Prolegomena to its 
History with Addenda and Postscript (Gloucester: Peter Smith, 1967 [originally 1947]). For a critical 
discussion, see Donald Worster, Under Western Skies. Nature and History in the American West (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1992), pp. 94-98. 
11  Pamela Riney-Kehrberg, Rooted in Dust: Surviving Drought and Depression in Southwestern Kansas 
(Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1994), p. 117. 
12  Mary W. M. Hargreaves, Dry Farming in the Northern Great Plains. Years of Readjustment, 1920-1990 
(Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1993), p. 3; Mary W. M. Hargreaves, "The Dry-Farming Movement 
in Retrospect," Agricultural History 51 (1997): 149-165; pp. 152-156. 
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The cumulative result was that as soon as drought set in, a strange speechlessness fell upon 
the region. What could one say, after all? Farmers could not pour over long-term 
meteorological information, for no one had any. They could not consult experts, for they were 
just as clueless. The only thing left to do was to plow and sow nonetheless, watch the 
cloudless sky, and somehow keep up hope. If optimism finally collapsed, they could pack up 
and try their luck elsewhere. Migration was a significant part of the Dust Bowl experience and 
became immortalized in John Steinbeck’s The Grapes of Wrath, a Pulitzer Prize-winning 
novel that followed the Joad family on its exodus from the Dust Bowl region to California.13 
Hundreds of thousands left the region westward during the Great Depression, with drought 
being one of several grievances in the agricultural regions of Oklahoma, Texas, Arkansas, and 
Missouri. Migrants usually had a hard time making a living, experienced marginalization 
from older California residents – they became known as “Okies” in reference to the state of 
Oklahoma –, often worked as poorly paid farm workers and formed a distinct subculture that 
survived far into the post-war years.14 Scholars have studied the fate of these migrants 
closely, which had an unfortunate side effect in that it drew attention away from the Dust 
Bowl region. “When the story of the Dust Bowl is told, it is most often the story of those who 
left”, Riney-Kehrberg wrote.15 In these narratives of what we would nowadays call climate 
migration, the Southern Plains inevitably figured as a disaster region, a mere backdrop to the 
real drama of migration and discrimination. Furthermore, these studies nourished the 
impression that the dismal conditions basically left the hapless residents no choice but to 
leave. It would add insult to injury to inquire whether migrants would have fared better back 
home. However, Dust Bowl migrants were a minority both among the migrants to California 
– most of them came from areas farther east – and among the locals. Even severely affected 
regions like southwestern Kansas did not lose more than a quarter of their population.16 
 
 
The Pictures 
 
The Great Depression reached the Southern Plains with some delay. In January 1930, 
Nation’s Business published a map that showed Kansas as one of the few American regions 
with good business conditions, an assessment that became front-page news in the region. But 
when farmers brought in a bumper crop in 1931, depressed wheat prices meant that they could 
only sell it at a loss. The drought set in just after the harvest and stayed until the 1939 growing 
season.17 With that, the region found itself where most of the United States was since October 
1929: in a dismal economic situation with no easy remedy. The rest of the country had plenty                                                         
13  John Steinbeck, The Grapes of Wrath (New York: Viking Press, 1939). 
14  James N. Gregory, American Exodus: The Dust Bowl Migration and Okie Culture in California (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1989). 
15  Riney-Kehrberg, Rooted in Dust, p. 2. 
16  Gregory, American Exodus, p. 11; Riney-Kehrberg, Rooted in Dust, p. 2. 
17  Riney-Kehrberg, Rooted in Dust, p. 15, 21. 
 6 
of problems of its own, and even in normal times, trouble in a peripheral region was not the 
kind of stuff that generates excitement. But the Southern Plains had one thing that set its 
troubles apart from the rest of the nation: it offered dramatic pictures with iconic potential. 
Due to its limited mobility, the soil is a transcultural synonym for stability and 
permanence. Seeing this soil airborne was the perfect symbol for disturbing times: the huge 
clouds of dust, captured in a number of spectacular photographs, were the perfect metaphor 
for a world in which all certainties were evaporating. The dramatic stories from survivors 
complemented that reading nicely. Getting caught in a dust storm was a traumatic experience: 
people were struggling to breathe while witnessing the destruction of their property. It was 
frightening. It was disturbing. It was unprecedented in living memory. And it matched the 
sense of undeserved victimization that spread as the Great Depression held U.S. society in its 
grip. The dust storms were for the Southern Plains what the stock market crash of 1929 was 
for the national economy – an anonymous threat, mysterious and beyond control, sweeping 
aside everyone and everything in its path. 
The outmigration from the region fitted perfectly into the tapestry of doom. It suggested, in 
the words of James Gregory, “a pathetic failure of the American Dream”.18 People lost their 
land, rather than gain some. The prevailing sentiment was despair rather than hope. And in the 
end, migrants found that they had traded one set of hardships for another one: California 
offered them seasonal jobs with meager pay and the experience of ethnic discrimination. The 
promise of a better life, if not for oneself then for one’s children, seemed to vanish in the 
searing sun of California. The Grapes of Wrath ends with a stillborn baby and the flooding of 
the Joad family home. 
The dust storms were real, and they were dangerous; but they were only one facet of the 
overall problem. The underlying challenge was the drought and its effect on farm production. 
In fact, Dust Bowl pictures depict only the most dramatic events where people were 
completely helpless in the face of huge walls of moving sand. The disaster also comprised 
countless smaller, local episodes where fields dried up and caused trouble for neighbors; the 
locals said that these fields were “blowing”. Faced with these conditions, humans were not 
quite as defenseless: it was possible to stop a blowing field by cultivating the land, and that 
was what many people did to save their belongings from the destructive effect of blowing 
sand. It is quite revealing that these acts of self-defense received far less attention than the 
spectacular pictures of doom: the iconography of the Dust Bowl favored overpowered humans 
over alert and active ones. Or so it was outside the regions, as the people of the Southern 
Plains were more interested in self-defense than in metaphors of American decline. A district 
court in Haskell County, Kansas even suspended property rights for blowing fields when it 
gave farmers the right to enter and work neighboring land in order to stop wind erosion.19 
                                                        
18  Gregory, American Exodus, p. xiv. 
19  Riney-Kehrberg, Rooted in Dust, p. 122. 
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Pictures made the Dust Bowl, but the supply was limited. It was difficult to take good 
pictures of a dust storm, particularly in the age of black-and-white photography. Timing was 
crucial: the camera moment was when a big storm was just about to hit. Once inside the 
storm, the sand made for a dizzy haze that brought unspectacular pictures. For an innocent 
observer, it was hard to tell the difference from pictures in a run-of-the-mill fog. Blowing 
fields were even harder to capture in photographs. That opened a niche for the arts, and one of 
the people who filled this void was the painter Alexandre Hogue. Having long lived in the 
region, Hogue painted a number of hyperrealistic pictures of the disaster, which prompted 
Life to label him (to his chagrin) “artist of the Dust Bowl”.20 His 1936 oil painting Drought 
Survivors – it featured two dead cows, a tractor drowning in sand dunes, and a rattlesnake – 
found its way into Joachim Radkau’s schoolbook on environmental history, with Radkau 
noting that the picture captures the essence of the Dust Bowl better than many contemporary 
photographs (“eindrucksvoller als viele Fotos”).21 
Life knew a few things about good pictures, but the underlying assumption that visuals 
would enhance understanding of the world looked rather ambiguous beyond the confines of 
New York editorial offices. Dust Bowl pictures were essentially a surrogate for engagement 
with local opinion – a kind of visual long-distance philanthropy that gracefully glossed over 
what commiseration meant on the ground. Many residents of the region hated being portrayed 
as living in a disaster region, and that was not just a matter of discourse ethics but also one of 
action. When Hogue’s Drought Survivors was on display at the Pan-American Exposition in 
Dallas, the Dalhart Chamber of Commerce voted to send a representative in order to buy it 
and bring it back to town. The Chamber wanted to make a statement, and it was not just about 
the arts: it planned a demonstration in the streets of Dalhart with the burning of Hogue’s 
picture as the climactic event. It was the Chamber’s thriftiness that saved the picture for 
posterity. It budgeted 50 dollars for the purchase, but the market price for the picture was in a 
range of 2,000 dollars.22 It was an orthodox Marxist’s dream come true, a perfect congruence 
of cultural and monetary capital, and it was a fitting mirror of the prevailing balance of power. 
A depression-plagued nation found that the Dust Bowl provided the perfect template for its 
woes, and it cared little about divergent local sentiments. What were the chances of locals to 
challenge hegemonic interpretations if they could not even buy a picture? 
 
 
Defenders of the Soil 
 
When drought befell the Southern Plains, the United States had no agency for the protection 
of agricultural soils. When rain returned in 1940, the federal government entertained the                                                         
20  Donald Worster, Dust Bowl: The Southern Plains in the 1930s (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1979), p. 
32. 
21  Joachim Radkau, Mensch und Natur in der Geschichte. Kursmaterialien Geschichte Sekundarstufe 
II/Kollegstufe (Leipzig: Ernst Klett Schulbuchverlag, 2002), p. 172. 
22  Worster, Dust Bowl, p. 32n. 
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largest soil conservation agency in the world, the U.S. Soil Conservation Service. The 
chronological overlap suggests a causal link, if not a founding myth: having seen the effect of 
soil erosion in dramatic pictures, the nation rose to the challenge and set up a well-funded 
agency to fight back. As the Natural Resources Conservation Service, the institutional heir of 
the Soil Conservation Service, declares in its online Brief History of NRCS, “Perhaps no event 
did more to emphasize the severity of the erosion crisis in the popular imagination than the 
Dust Bowl.”23 
However, the Southern Plains were not the only U.S. region with a serious erosion 
problem. Soil erosion was a typical problem in frontier regions, as new patterns of land use 
changed vegetation cover and the dynamics of nature. In places such as the Palouse in the 
states of Washington and Idaho, agriculture was virtually impossible without erosion.24 In the 
interwar years, the spread of tractors brought new challenges because of concerns about soil 
compaction and new plowing techniques. In the American South, concerns about the soil 
went back to debates in the early nineteenth century.25 The region even had a proto-
environmental history that focused on soil depletion before drought settled on the Great 
Plains. In 1926, Avery Craven published his famous and controversial book Soil Exhaustion 
as a Factor in the Agricultural History of Virginia and Maryland, 1606–1860.26 As seen from 
the South, the creation of the U.S. Soil Conservation Service was not so much an innovation 
as the conclusion of a search for institutional forms that had been going on for a generation.27 
The American South carried far more political weight than the Southern Plains, and it was 
by all means characteristic that the rise of American soil conservation is intimately 
intertwined with a Southerner. Hugh Hammond Bennett led the Soil Conservation Service 
from its foundation until his retirement in 1952, and his roots in the South – he was born in 
Wadesboro, North Carolina – shaped his view of soil conservation. He published a lengthy 
monograph on The Soils and Agriculture of the Southern States in 1921. Even his travel 
patterns as chief of the Soil Conservation Service reflected his personal background.28 
Bennett frequently visited Southern states and gave numerous presentations in the region 
while showing scant interest in anything west of the Mississippi River: the Hugh Hammond 
Bennett Papers at Iowa State University do not record a single speech in the Dust Bowl region 
                                                        
23  75 Years Helping People Help the Land: A Brief History of NRCS, available online at 
http://www.nrcs.usda.gov/wps/portal/nrcs/detail/national/about/history/?cid=nrcs143_021392 (accessed 
December 16, 2014). 
24  Cf. Andrew P. Duffin, Plowed Under: Agriculture and Environment in the Palouse (Seattle: University of 
Washington Press, 2007). 
25  Cf. Steven Stoll, Larding the Lean Earth: Soil and Society in Nineteenth-Century America (New York: Hill 
& Wang, 2002); Benjamin R. Cohen, Notes from the Ground: Science, Soil and Society in the American 
Countryside (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2009). 
26  Avery Craven, Soil Exhaustion as a Factor in the Agricultural History of Virginia and Maryland, 1606–1860 
(Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 2006). 
27  Cf. Paul S. Sutter, "What Gullies Mean: Georgia’s 'Little Grand Canyon' and Southern Environmental 
History," Journal of Southern History 76 (2010): 579-616. 
28  Hugh Hammond Bennett, The Soils and Agriculture of the Southern States (New York: Macmillan, 1921). 
 9 
during the 1930s.29 Douglas Helms, the National Historian at the Natural Resources 
Conservation Service, has noted that the Dust Bowl region was missing in a 1933 regional 
erosion map that Bennett prepared and that none of the Service’s original demonstration 
projects served the region.30 
Bennett’s personal predilections matter, as it is hard to overstate his significance for soil 
conservation. He ran the defining U.S. agency for almost two decades, and he wrote 
numerous articles and published two authoritative volumes on the topic, Soil Conservation in 
1939 and Elements of Soil Conservation in 1947.31 He also had a towering personality: a 1951 
biography celebrates “Big Hugh” as “the father of soil conservation”.32 Bennett is one of the 
few remaining “great white men” in American history that is still waiting for a critical 
biographer. 
While wind was the prime cause of erosion in the Southern Plains, water was the crucial 
factor in the American South. As a result, Bennett was ill equipped to tackle the Dust Bowl. 
In fact, he did not realize the political potential of what would become the quintessential 
American soil erosion disaster until others urged him to look westwards. In February 1934, 
the Secretary of the Interior, Harold Ickes, wrote a memorandum that pointed Bennett “to the 
condition in the Dakotas and I think in Montana, where the wind is blowing off the top soil” 
and suggested that Bennett write “a paragraph on this”.33 Bennett did as requested, and his 
response mirrored a sense of bewilderment, both by the peculiarities of the region and by 
wind erosion more generally: “It was predicted last year when we discussed the matter of 
doing something about the evil that it would be twenty-five years before anything of the kind 
would happen again. But the very same thing is going on again this year.”34 Four months 
later, Bennett warned in a letter to Ickes that the land in the Southern Plains “is in optimum 
condition for the greatest possible destructive effects from heavy rain that may occur any 
time.”35 Obviously, Bennett did not yet understand that people in the Dust Bowl region were 
hoping for rain, rather than fearing it. 
Bennett ran a burgeoning institution. In 1933, his agency was founded as the Soil Erosion 
Service within the Department of the Interior, which Harold Ickes sought to make into a 
department of conservation at the time. After some interdepartmental wrangling, the Soil 
Erosion Service was transferred to the U.S. Department of Agriculture in 1935 and renamed                                                         
29  Iowa State University Library, Special Collections Department, Ames, Iowa, MS-164 (Hugh Hammond 
Bennett Papers) Box 10. 
30  Douglas Helms, "Hugh Hammond Bennett and the Creation of the Soil Conservation Service," Journal of 
Soil and Water Conservation 65:2 (March 2010): 37A-47A; p. 41A. 31  Hugh Hammond Bennett, Soil Conservation (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1939), and Hugh Hammond Bennett, 
Elements of Soil Conservation (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1947). 
32  Wellington Brink, Big Hugh: The Father of Soil Conservation (New York: Macmillan, 1951). 
33  National Archives of the United States, College Park, RG 114 (Records of the Natural Resources 
Conservation Service) Entry 1 Box 1 Folder “February 1934”, Harold L. Ickes, Secretary, Department of the 
Interior, Memorandum for Mr. Bennett, February 10, 1934. 
34  Ibid., attachment to memorandum for the Secretary of the Interior, February 10, 1934. 
35  National Archives of the United States RG 114 Entry 1 Box 1 Folder “June-July 1934”, Bennett, 
memorandum for the Secretary of the Interior, June 4, 1934, p. 2.  
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Soil Conservation Service, the name that it would keep until 1995.36 On June 30, 1937, the 
Soil Conservation Service had 952 employees in its Washington office and 12,379 in the field 
service.37 Within only four years, staff had grown to five-digit figures and thus reached a 
level that it would maintain for decades. In light of the turbulent history of other New Deal 
agencies, it is remarkable that appropriations for the Soil Conservation Service rose in all but 
one year until 1969, when the Service had 14,872 permanent full-time positions.38  
Building a large bureaucracy from scratch was no small achievement, and yet Bennett was 
no dedicated institution-builder. William Van Dersal, who joined the Service in April 1935 
and retired in 1972, said in an oral history interview, “As an administrator, I think he was 
lousy.” Van Dersal found him “a great crusader”, but “sometimes almost childlike in what he 
would do.”39 One of Bennett’s successors, Donald Williams, concurred: “Bennett was never 
known to be a good administrator. He was a technical man, a professional man and noted 
worldwide for his capabilities in that regard.”40 In other words, Bennett’s legacy lay not just 
in the creation of an enduring institution. He imbued the Soil Conservation Service with a 
sense of mission that resonates to this day. Together with his associates, he was not just 
fighting soil erosion – he was running a moral crusade, and the issue at stake was nothing less 
than the future of America. As early as April 1934, Bennett declared in a memorandum for 
the Secretary of the Interior that “unrestrained soil erosion, if permitted to continue, will result 
in the virtual elimination of civilization from great areas of the United States”.41 
Bennett shared his vision in numerous speeches. They typically offered a grand narrative 
about the rise and erosion-induced fall of many a civilization: “History has shown time and 
again that no large nation can long endure the continuous mismanagement of its soil 
resources. The world is strewn with the ruins of once flourishing civilizations, destroyed by 
erosion”, Bennett told the Southwest Soil and Water Conservation Conference in Tyler, Texas 
in 1935.42 The remainder of his talk offered facts and figures supplied by his burgeoning 
administrative machinery, along with a notably vague vision of actual policies. According to 
his manuscript, he concluded with a call for the “application of practical erosion-control 
measures on large watersheds in the various agricultural regions of the country, in cooperation 
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40  Iowa State University Library, Special Collections Department, MS-198 Box 3 Folder 1, Oral History 
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with conservancy districts, erosion control associations or similar organizations.”43 Means 
were obviously negotiable, but the mission was not. 
In The Coming of the New Deal, Arthur Schlesinger wrote that “soil conservation was 
almost a religion” for Bennett and that he preached its gospel “with Old Testament wrath.”44 
It was a fitting description: even in the midst of the Great Depression, Bennett and his 
associates were never shy to declare that soil erosion was the nation’s most important 
problem. In fact, the Old Testament was not simply a given for devout soil conservationists, 
as the self-declared prophets felt that the time-honored book might be up for some editing. 
Walter Lowdermilk, the second man in the Soil Conservation Service until his retirement in 
1947, suggested in a 1939 speech in Jerusalem that it was time for an Eleventh 
Commandment that should read as follows: 
 
“Thou shalt inherit the holy earth as a faithful steward, conserving its resources and 
productivity from generation to generation. Thou shalt protect thy fields from soil 
erosion and thy hills from overgrazing by thy herds, so that thy descendants may have 
abundance forever. If any shall fail in this stewardship of the land, his fertile fields shall 
become sterile stones and gullies, and his descendants shall decrease and live in poverty 
or vanish from the face of the earth.”45 
 
It was a bit like the soil conservation version of the Jerusalem Syndrome, but it was no 
isolated moment of hyperbole. Lowdermilk liked the Eleventh Commandment so much that 
he made it his default conclusion in speeches.46 
The tale about soil and civilization found few enthusiasts among depression-plagued 
farmers, who were usually more concerned with how to pay the next installment. It fared 
better as a literary genre, as the narrative gave birth to a distinct tradition of soil erosion 
history: sweeping overviews that see humans abusing soils throughout human history and 
henceforth suffering from the consequences. Randal Beeman and James Pritchard have called 
them “soil jeremiads”.47 It was a kind of “environmental history before environmental 
history” that survived far beyond the years of the New Deal. The tradition of “soil jeremiads” 
includes Russell Lord’s Behold Our Land (1938), Edward Hyams’ Soil and Civilization 
(1952), Vernon G. Carter’s and Tom Dale’s Topsoil and Civilization (1955), and John 
Seymour’s and Herbert Girardet’s Far from Paradise (1986). The most recent incarnation is 
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the 2007 book Dirt: The Erosion of Civilizations by University of Washington geologist 
David Montgomery.48 
However, it was one thing to claim the moral high ground with soil narratives and quite 
another to devise effective policies. One cannot stress too much how Bennett’s vision was 
disconnected from political realities. As created in 1933, the Soil Erosion Service was 
concerned first and foremost with the creation of demonstration projects that sought to show 
the feasibility of soil conservation all over the country. As if that was not enough of a 
challenge, the Soil Conservation Service also suffered from a lack of personnel: soil 
conservationists were one of the few expert groups that were in short supply during the Great 
Depression. The early correspondence of the Service includes numerous complaints from 
other agencies that Bennett was luring away the best people with better pay, with Bennett 
usually noting apologetically that the lack of qualified staffers gave him no choice. While the 
Service’s sense of purpose was crystal-clear from the outset, its policies were in a state of 
evolution. In retrospect, Walter Lowdermilk compared it to “a chess game; we make a move 
and then see what happens to direct us to make another move. Each step leads to another 
step.”49 
 
 
Institutional Learning 
 
There are many ways to impress Congress. Quoting a dictator is one of the more unusual 
ones. Hugh Bennett did exactly that when he spoke before a subcommittee of the House of 
Representatives Committee on Public Lands on 20 March 1935. He fondly mentioned Italy’s 
Bonifica Integrale program, an Integrated Land Reclamation program whose essence, 
according to Bennett, was summed up nicely by Benito Mussolini: “Reclaim the land, and 
with the land the man, and with the man the race.” It was not just the alleged expenditure of $ 
500 million for soil and water conservation or the employment of 80,000 people that caught 
Bennett’s attention. It was the freedom of action, the ability of the Fascist government to act 
without petty concerns about costs or objections from landowners: “The Italian Government 
does not profess to apply an economic yardstick to its program.”50 
The Mussolini reference revealed more than an underdeveloped political instinct. Bennett’s 
early policy drafts breathe a distinctly authoritarian air. “It is proposed that legislation be 
asked of Congress to supply the necessary authority for the formulation and regulation of                                                         
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Conservancy Districts to meet the requirements for coordinated land use”, Bennett wrote in a 
January 27, 1934 memorandum for the Secretary of the Interior. These “Conservancy 
Districts” would permit “regulations of land use in so far as is necessary to safeguard the 
interests of all concerned”.51 When asked to justified the expenditure of federal funds for 
erosion control on private land three months later, Bennett used the occasion to suggest new 
enforcement powers: “The expenditure of funds in any state might be made contingent on the 
state passing zoning laws requiring all property owners to cooperate in erosion control 
through the proper use of their own land and through financial contributions.”52 In short, 
government planning, and legal coercion if need be, were supposed to be the crucial 
instruments in the upcoming soil conservation drive. 
These visions might seem like a long shot for a young Service that stole its expertise 
together from competing agencies. But it was the logical outgrowth of its guiding philosophy: 
if one was out to save human civilization, the drive for direct action was almost irresistible. 
The real work of the Service was far too modest to satisfy a Messianic spirit. It did not even 
promise a long-term solution. Even if all demonstration projects had evolved as planned, and 
if Bennett had been a man of patience, these projects were spread too thin around the country 
to reach more than a fraction of the farm population. And, in any case, if farmers were unable 
to stop erosion by themselves, why shouldn’t the government intervene and force them to act 
better? The New Deal encouraged a more assertive role of federal agencies, and Harold Ickes’ 
Department of the Interior was a place for bold visions of environmental stewardship. 
Furthermore, Bennett’s vision fitted squarely into departmental traditions. Since the 
Progressive Era, the Department of the Interior was aiming for land use regulation in the 
common interest, and fights with vested interests were simply the price to be paid.53 
The outlook for enforcement dimmed when the Soil Conservation Service was placed in 
the U.S. Department of Agriculture in 1935. Since its creation in 1862, the Department of 
Agriculture was committed to helping and educating farmers, and it had built an elaborate 
network of research and extension over the decades. It was more difficult to imagine land use 
regulation in this context, all the more as the Soil Conservation Service had to prevail in 
countless turf wars with preexisting institutions. In fact, the Soil Conservation Service gained 
an intradepartmental competition in its own field of expertise when the Supreme Court 
annulled the farm subsidies program under the first Agricultural Adjustment Act on January 
6, 1936. The Department of Agriculture hastily set up a new program of direct payments that 
was destined to reduce the planting of “soil depleting” crops in an Agricultural Conservation 
Program.54 With that, the federal government had two soil conservation programs in the same 
department, with the Agricultural Conservation Program commanding more than four times                                                         
51  National Archives of the United States RG 114 Entry 1 Box 1 Folder “February 1934”, H. H. Bennett, 
Director, Soil Erosion Service, Memorandum for the Secretary of the Interior, January 27, 1934. 
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the financial resources of the Soil Conservation Service.55 Frictions were inevitable, and they 
went straight down to divergent approaches. The Agricultural Conservation Program focused 
on single measures where compliance was easy to monitor while the Soil Conservation 
Service favored farm plans based on a comprehensive assessment of individual conditions.56 
It was difficult to imagine comprehensive land use planning under these conditions, and 
yet the self-appointed stewards of the soil found it hard to abandon the concept. As late as 
1947, the Soil Conservation Service published a brochure on Land Use Regulation in Soil 
Conservation Districts that had Bennett gently urging a tougher stance in his foreword: 
“Traditionally, whenever and wherever necessary in the public interest, our American way 
has also provided a method whereby an unwilling few can be required to accede to certain 
actions taken by the majority.”57 More than twenty years later, Lowdermilk was still 
remorseful about the lack of enforcement powers. “We have not yet reached the point where 
we would accept this type of regulation”, he noted. The New Deal would have been the 
perfect moment to claim those powers, but the exigencies of a new federal program forced the 
Service to let the moment pass: “Our time generally was so occupied in cooperating with 
interested farmers, we left until a later time, attempts to regulate by law the proper use of land 
by reluctant farmers.”58 
The Soil Conservation Service eventually came to terms with its educational role, if only 
for lack of alternatives. Advice and technical assistance became the instruments of choice, 
making the everyday work of soil conservation akin to “selling insurance”, as a long-time 
employee noted retrospectively.59 With that, the daily work of the Soil Conservation Service 
was far removed from the grand narratives of soil and civilization: personal cooperation and 
concrete offers for help were what defined soil conservation in practice. Still, it is interesting 
that Bennett left it to his successor, Robert M. Salter, to elevate this practice to the status of 
actual policy, with the Cold War providing a convenient rationalization. Speaking at the 
annual meeting of the National Association of Soil Conservation Districts in 1952, Salter 
declared that soil conservation “must be done within the framework of our American 
principles of human freedom and free enterprise. The last thing we want is to resort to 
compulsion by government edict. [...] That is the way Mr. Stalin is introducing technology 
into Soviet agriculture. But, free enterprise has no place in that system.”60 Seventeen years                                                         
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after invoking Mussolini, the leadership of the Soil Conservation Service finally acceded to 
what the rank and file had long learned to live with: it made peace with democracy. 
 
 
Enter Environmentalism 
 
Salter’s speech also spelled out what cooperation meant in a 1950s context: boosting 
production. “We need to concentrate on increasing yields on grassland and treeland as well as 
on cultivated land,” Salter told his audience.61 It brought Salter a public dispute with his 
predecessor who charged him of “wrecking soil conservation” – another piece of evidence 
showing that Bennett was largely oblivious of the dynamics that was driving soil conservation 
practice.62 “In the postwar years, the SCS program appealed in particular to the young, the 
well-to-do, the educated, and the entrepreneurial farmer – all those in the forefront of 
American agribusiness”, Donald Worster wrote.63 As part of its emphatic embrace of 
productivism, the Soil Conservation Service began to promote farm drainage, and that 
brought it into conflict with wildlife protection, which became a growing source of trouble 
with the boom of the environmental movement during the 1960s and 1970s.64 
The Soil Conservation Service saw itself as a legitimate heir of the conservation tradition. 
Against that background, coming under fire from conservation interests was a traumatic 
experience. As Mel Davis, chief of the Soil Conservation Service from 1975 to 1979, recalled 
in an interview, “Those environmental groups, and I can take the National Wildlife Federation 
as a specific example, gave me hell up one side and down the other, yet they never came to 
my office to sit down and talk to me about these problems. They would leave it up to you to 
come over there because they thought that they were in the driver’s seat now.”65 The 
quotation shows that the split was as much about policies as about style. The 
environmentalists showed only scant interest in the cooperation that stood at the center of soil 
conservation work since the New Deal. 
The gap between environmentalists and the Soil Conservation Service was first and 
foremost a matter of discourse. The environmentalists had the language of ecology – the 
Service had a language of cooperation and education, but it aimed for farmers only; for the 
wider public, the Soil Conservation Service had a powerful narrative about its goals and 
legitimacy but not about its everyday practice. It was a veritable clash of intellectual worlds,                                                         
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perhaps deeper in style and rhetoric than in actual concerns, and it left deep marks down to 
the choice of words. When Douglas Helms used the word “environmental” in an oral history 
interview in 1981, Gordon K. Zimmerman, a Soil Conservation Service employee since 1935, 
retorted sharply, “The word ‘environment’ is a poisonous word with a lot of our people.”66 
The sense of disorientation did not remain confined to matters of policy. Environmental 
historians were quick to seize on the Dust Bowl, most prominently Donald Worster, whose 
third book, Dust Bowl, offered a new interpretation of the event. “The ultimate meaning of the 
dust storms in the 1930s was that America as a whole, not just the plains, was badly out of 
balance with its natural environment”, Worster wrote. From his point of view, the Dust Bowl 
was akin to an environmental nemesis, the logical result of a nation’s approach to 
environmental issues: “the inevitable outcome of a culture that deliberately, self-consciously, 
set itself that task of dominating and exploiting the land for all it was worth.” Worster’s 
critique of that culture, shaped as it was by “capitalism” as “the decisive factor in this nation’s 
use of nature”, was just to the taste of left-leaning American academics. Dust Bowl won the 
Bancroft Prize in 1980 and is widely hailed as an environmental history classic.67 It inspired a 
tradition that had environmentalists using the event as their nuclear option: if everything else 
fails, you always have the Dust Bowl. It has happened, it was terrible, and it will happen 
again if we do not change expeditiously.68 
Curiously, Worster’s Dust Bowl was not the only book on the topic published in 1979. Paul 
Bonnifield’s The Dust Bowl offered an altogether different narrative. He told the story of the 
Dust Bowl as a tale of federal intrusions into Midwestern affairs. His goal was to exonerate 
the farmers of the plains from undeserved criticism: “the story of the heartland of the dust 
bowl is the chronicle of hardworking, stouthearted folks who withstood the onslaught of 
nature at its worst, while living through a devastating depression and facing government 
idealism”, Bonnifield declared.69 Students of American environmental policy will recognize 
the tune: hardworking people, undeserved hardships, arrogant feds, and no one around with 
some common sense. Bonnifield’s narrative neatly encapsulates the anti-environmental, “pro-
business” sentiment that has been a fixture of American politics since the 1970s.70 
Reviewers were less than impressed. Human Ecology called Bonnifield’s book “partisan” 
and “disappointing”, and the American Historical Review declared that “local efforts need to 
be seen in a broader context”.71 But from the viewpoint of memory studies, it makes for a 
fascinating complement to Worster’s narrative: here we have, published in the same year, the 
two themes that have dominated the American environmental discourse ever since. Even                                                         
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more, both sides never felt the urge to discuss with the opposite faction, obviously sensing 
that intellectual engagement would elevate the other side unduly. Interestingly, neither book 
inspired further studies that would have refined the two arguments, let alone explored the 
middle ground. With Worster and Bonnifield, environmentalists and anti-environmentalists 
had said what had to be said. 
 
 
Local Opinion 
 
More than a decade went by until Pamela Riney-Kehrberg published another book on the 
Dust Bowl. Her Rooted in Dust is a social history of those who suffered and stayed. Unlike 
Bonnifield, she gives due credit to federal assistance programs: “Without government aid, 
very few would have been able to remain farmers throughout the decade.”72 She is no more 
impressed with Worster’s book, asserting that it provides “a highly impressionistic 
examination of the ecological and social dimensions of the problems of the 1930s.”73 She 
counters both readings with an empirically rich description of everyday life in the region. 
Together with R. Douglas Hurt’s Dust Bowl of 1981, it is one of the few books about the topic 
that does not have an axe to grind.74 
The story that emerges is largely unheroic. It is about stubborn optimism, poverty, frail 
communities, and early experiments with irrigation. The book describes a complicated, 
incoherent set of local responses, and that is all the more interesting as Riney-Kehrberg 
zoomed in on only sixteen counties in the southwestern part of Kansas. It is a reminder that 
the Dust Bowl region is large and diverse when looked up close, and that means that archives 
can provide ample fodder for many divergent readings. There were many paths through the 
drought of the 1930s, and the absence of hubs and cultural centers prevented the region from 
distilling some iconic careers out of the chaos of different livelihoods. If the region is largely 
silent in the quest for cultural hegemony over the Dust Bowl, it is not for lack of things to say 
but for lack of a consensus about which stories matter most. 
The one thing that is clear is that the Dust Bowl did not inspire a reversal that would have 
matched the moral thrust of the soil jeremiads. The region never emerged as a model of 
responsible land stewardship, and never strived to be. As a result, erosion remains a critical 
problem on the Southern Plains to the present day. The most recent overview conducted by 
the National Resources Conservation Service, the 2007 National Resources Inventory, 
showed that the Southern Plains are losing 6.2 tons of soil per acre per year due to wind 
erosion, the highest figure for the major agricultural regions of the United States. Every year, 
the Southern Plains are losing more than 200 million tons of topsoil. But then, the region 
performed worst in a large community of sinners. Even the Corn Belt region, by far the region                                                         
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least prone to this type of erosion, is losing 15.9 million tons of soil to the wind every year.75 
Soil loss continues to worry agriculturalists globally, particularly in light of concerns about 
feeding more than 10 billion mouths in the twenty-first century world. It is not difficult to 
imagine that the Dust Bowl will figure prominently in future debates about the land and its 
fertility. That makes it all the more important to come to terms with the event. 
 
 
In the News 
 
In 2006, Timothy Egan published yet another book about the Dust Bowl. Following a time-
honored tradition, he did not care about preexisting readings. He did not even care about 
underlying causes and consequences. Instead, Egan focused on personal stories, many of them 
recounted through oral history interviews. His book drew on some real characters such as 
John McCarty, the founder of the Dalhart Last Man Club, where membership required a 
signed pledge not to abandon the land. McCarthy left in 1936. In fact, these “untold stories” 
were so important to Egan that he mentioned them in his subtitle. Egan is a Pulitzer-prize 
winning journalist, and thus knows the media fashions of the day: it will feel right if you 
make it personal. Egan produced a fitting Dust Bowl narrative for a media age that enjoys 
personal drama, particularly from a distance, and discounts abstract categories such as class, 
gender, and race, not to speak about cause and effect.76 
The book became a rousing success. It received a National Book Award and was named a 
New York Times Editors’ Choice. It stands a good chance of being the bestselling book about 
the Dust Bowl, if only in non-fiction (Steinbeck’s Grapes are hard to beat in the fiction 
genre). But as so often, the narrative said as much about contemporary sentiments. 
Recollections of hard times fell on fertile ground in a struggling American middle class. For 
those infatuated with the American “war on terror”, the narrative offered a dark, sinister 
enemy that attacks out of nowhere – a reading underscored by a dust jacket noting that the 
dust storms “terrorized” a region. In the year before the book launch, hurricane Katrina 
brought another disaster at the intersection of man and the natural world. In short, Egan’s 
book was about more than events of the 1930s. The Dust Bowl provided a multipurpose 
backdrop for the Great American Story of hardship and perseverance. 
In other words, Egan is using the Dust Bowl as a ploy for a much bigger story about 
America; but then, he is only the latest one to do so. Since the 1930s, the Dust Bowl has been 
a canvas for widely different narratives: about rural poverty and forced migration, about the                                                         
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need to save the soil, about capitalism’s environmental hubris, about the folly of federal 
policies, and, most recently, about hard times as such. The Dust Bowl obviously holds an 
attraction for those who seek moral clarity, or at least the semblance thereof. As one of the 
largest disasters in American history, it is a coveted prize that people of different stripes have 
sought to claim, and Egan’s book shows that the dust has not settled in the new millennium. 
The enduring hope is that the sheer force of those huge clouds of sand, a true monster in both 
material and metaphorical respect, will overwhelm all countervailing arguments. The reality 
is that Dust Bowl narratives say as much about history as about the authors’ political 
inclinations, or, in Egan’s case, the lack thereof. 
Curiously, these personal stories can coexist with phrases in the soil jeremiad tradition. 
Egan starts his book with a plea for “humility” and ends with glowing remarks about Bennett 
and his legacy.77 Dayton Duncan and Ken Burns, who published a coffee table book that went 
with an oral history documentary, had no problems with environmental rhetoric either. 
According to the preface, their book offers “a morality tale about our relationship to the land 
that sustains us – a lesson we ignore at our peril.”78 Media people know that some sprinkles of 
green usually come across well, particularly as they will not develop a life of their own if they 
stay aloft of groups and political agendas. 
It is easy to criticize the superficial green rhetoric of media types, but that would be easier 
if statements from the environmental camp were less flimsy. As this article was going to 
press, Laurent Fabius, the foreign minister of France and chairman of the upcoming Paris 
climate summit, published an article that invoked the Dust Bowl in order to underscore that it 
was high time to get serious about climate change.79 In other words, the newsroom vision at 
the beginning of this article is much closer to reality than one might have expected. In 
common environmentalist rhetoric, the Dust Bowl is tantamount to a free-floating icon with 
human drama and nice pictures that we readily consume without much thought until the next 
thing catches our eye. But then, we do not have to leave it at that. 
 
 
Soil Stories for the 21st Century, or: What Is The Dust Bowl Really Good For? 
 
For all their differences, Dust Bowl narratives have traditionally been about generalities. 
Curiously, the practice of soil conservation favors the opposite mindset: it is about close 
observation, about context, and about solutions that suit local peculiarities. Erosion control 
requires balancing a wide range of factors from rainfall and humidity to market prices, and 
soils tend to defy universal panaceas through their own intricacies. However, these local 
decisions are not necessarily made locally: they are framed by policies and institutions, 
resources and narratives. The link between grand narratives and local practices has been                                                         
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79  Laurent Fabius, "Das Klima der Angst," Die Zeit no. 19 (May 7, 2015), p. 11. 
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notoriously weak throughout history, and it is here that historians should get to work as the 
seek Dust Bowl stories for the 21st century. 
As we have seen, the chasm between grand narratives and everyday practice goes right 
back to the hasty buildup of a soil conservation bureaucracy during the New Deal. The self-
declared defenders of the soil had a great story about soil and civilization and enormous 
financial resources, but they had no clear idea on how to get farmers into their camp. 
Authoritarian visions à la Mussolini were the direct result of an approach that was strong on 
moral conviction and short on understanding for the intricacies of decisions on the farm. The 
Soil Conservation Service eventually learned how to get the ear of the farmer, with money 
and technical support emerging as the key instruments, but the cooperation of farmers and soil 
conservationists never found an expression in iconic stories. The Soil Conservation Service 
boasted about being good friends with the farmers – mandatory rhetoric in the U.S. 
Department of Agriculture – but it was reluctant to tell real stories of soil conservation out in 
the fields, presumably because these stories were usually too ambiguous for a great moral 
crusade. That is where scholars should start to dig. 
Such an endeavor can connect with the latest trend in Dust Bowl historiography: computer 
use. Scholars such as Geoff Cunfer have compiled huge amounts of data and use them to map 
regional and local situations in great detail.80 These publications give us a better idea of the 
diversity of local situations and allow us to move closer to experiences on the ground without 
the vagaries of anecdotal evidence. With that, these publications may open a new window on 
the daily struggles of people out in the fields. Most Dust Bowl narratives have treated 
terraces, no-tillage plowing and other anti-erosion practices as to how they relate to broader 
mindsets, but it could be rewarding to discuss them more in their own right. The real fight 
against erosion has usually been about compromises rather than moral absolutes, and we need 
to know more about how these compromises were forged. 
Of course, computer use can also lead to a different result. It is quite possible that the sheer 
masses of data will drown clear conclusions in a cataclysm of complications, an outcome that 
would befit an age where having superabundant information ranks higher than actually 
understanding it. Quantitative data has its own unique way to foster tunnel vision, remarks 
such as “closer to the ground the story remains more complex” raise a certain suspicion.81 It 
seems that we can make more out of data-driven projects if we connect the numbers with the 
mythology of the Dust Bowl: a better awareness of realities on the ground is also an 
opportunities to see grand narratives as a part of local and regional histories. We know the 
great stories of soil conservation expertise, of hardship and endurance, of adaptation and                                                         
80  Geoff Cunfer, On the Great Plains: Agriculture and Environment (College Station: Texas A&M University 
Press, 2005); Kenneth Sylvester, Geoff Cunfer, “An Unremembered Diversity: Mixed Husbandry and the 
American Grasslands,” Agricultural History 83 (2009): 352-383; Kenneth M. Sylvester, Eric S. A. Rupley, 
"Revising the Dust Bowl: High Above the Kansas Grasslands," Environmental History 17 (2012): 603-633. 
All these publications make a point of contradicting existing Dust Bowl narratives, but they treat them as 
more homogeneous than they really were. 
81  Sylvester and Cunfer, Unremembered Diversity, p. 354.  
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federal aid, but we need to bring these stories into a dialogue with what went on out in the 
field and see where narratives reinforced practical efforts, where tensions emerged, and where 
situations on the ground encouraged reinterpretations. Myths are no less part of the reality of 
agriculture than tractors and mineral fertilizer. 
These stories will likely be more complicated and contradictory than existing narratives, 
but that is precisely the point: in an age where the trade value of clear-cut Dust Bowl tales is 
undergoing rapid inflation, there is a market for authentic, ambivalent stories. After all, 
environmentalists of the twenty-first century know a thing or two about ambivalence. The 
door is wide open for a new generation of Dust Bowl historiography that combines sensitivity 
to regional specifics with an awareness of wider contexts. But such a history will remain 
below its potential if it does not incorporate existing narratives, their underlying interests, and 
their affiliations. We need a mythology of the Dust Bowl as we search for a new 
environmental history in the twenty-first century. And we need it to understand where we are 
in the eternal fight for fertile soil. 
 
 
 
